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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Williams appeals from the district court's order dismissing his post-conviction 
petition. On appeal, Mr. Williams argues that the district court abused its discretion 
when it denied his request for the appointment of post-conviction counsel. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Williams pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine. State v. Williams, Unpublished Opinion 312, p.1 (Ct. App. April 9, 
2013). 1 The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, 
and retained jurisdiction. Id. Upon review of Mr. Williams' period of retained jurisdiction 
(hereinafter, rider), the district court suspended the sentence and placed him on 
probation. Id. 
While Mr. Williams was on probation in the First Case, he was charged with 
stalking in the first degree in the Second Case. Id. at 1-2. In the Second Case, 
Mr. Williams pleaded guilty to stalking in the first degree and the district court imposed a 
concurrent unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed. Id. at 2. In the First 
1 This opinion deals with a two consolidated appeals. While the record in this matter 
primarily focuses with the criminal matter that began in 2010 (CR 2010-12830; Supreme 
Court docket number 39541 ), this brief will include the facts and procedural posture of a 
companion 2007 case (CR 2007-1783; Supreme Court docket number 39540), as it is 
not entirely clear from record in this matter if Mr. Williams' post-conviction petition 
relates to one or both of these cases. For example, the first page of the petition only 
references CR 2010-12830. (R., p.8.) However, the second page of the petition 
references the Supreme Court docket numbers for both cases. (R., p.9.) Additionally, 
this brief will refer to CR 2007-1783 as the "First Case" and CR 2010-12830 as the 
"Second Case." 
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Case, the district court revoked probation. Id. It retained jurisdiction in both cases. Id. 
After his second rider, the district court suspended the sentences and placed 
Mr. V\/illiams on probation in both cases. Id. 
Mr. Williams' probation agreement required him to comply with all of the terms of 
probation imposed by his probation officer. (R., p.22.) Mr. Williams' probation officer 
imposed terms of probation which were created to supervise those on probation for 
felony domestic battery. (R., p.13.) Eventually, the State alleged that he had violated 
the terms of probation imposed by his probation officer. (R., p.13.) After an evidentiary 
hearing, the district court found that Mr. Williams had violated the terms of his probation 
imposed by his probation officer when he left a voice message threatening to cut 
another person's throat.2 (R., pp.22-23.) The district court revoked probation in both 
cases. (R., p.23; Williams, Unpublished Opinion 312, p.2 (Ct. App. April 9, 2013).) 
Mr. Williams then filed a post-conviction petition alleging that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to his probation officer's imposition of the conditions of 
felony domestic battery probation. (R., pp.8-14.) In addition, Mr. Williams filed a motion 
requesting the appointment of counsel, supported by his claim of indigency. (R., pp.15-
20.) The district court denied Mr. Williams' request for counsel and entered a notice of 
intent to dismiss Mr. Williams' post-conviction petition. (R., pp.21-31.) Mr. Williams 
then filed an amended petition, wherein he made additional post-conviction claims. 
(R., pp.42-58.) In that petition, Mr. Williams indicated that he was going to proceed pro 
se but reserved the ability to challenge the district court's denial of his request for post-
2 The district court also found that Mr. Williams violated the terms of his probation by 
consuming alcohol and violating a no contact order. (R., pp.22-23.) 
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conviction counsel on appeal. (R., p.44.) Various motions were filed by both parties 
and the district court ultimately dismissed Mr. Williams' petition. (R., pp.114-115, 128.) 
Mr. Williams timely appealed. (R., pp.116-121.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Williams' motion for 
appointment of post-conviction counsel? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Williams' Motion For 
Appointment Of Post-Conviction Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Williams contends that his post-conviction petition, along with its supporting 
materials, satisfies the standard for appointment of counsel because it raises the 
possibility of a valid claim. Therefore, Mr. Williams' requests that, assuming his case is 
remanded, this Court order the district court to appoint counsel. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"A request for appointment of counsel in a post conviction proceeding is 
governed by Idaho Code § 19-4904, which provides that in proceedings under the 
UPCPA [Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act], a court-appointed attorney 'may be 
made available' to an applicant who is unable to pay the costs of representation. The 
decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel lies within the discretion 
of the district court." Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004). 
"When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether the lower 
court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within 
the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (quoting Associates 
Norlhwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603,605 (Ct. App.1987)). 
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C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Williams' Motion 
Requesting The Appointment Of Counsel Because He Alleged Facts Which 
Raised The Possibility Of A Valid Claim 
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Williams did not waive or forfeit his ability to 
challenge the district court's denial of his motion requesting the appointment of post-
conviction counsel. In his amended petition, Mr. Williams indicated that he was going to 
pursue the remainder of his post-conviction proceedings pro se. (R., p.44.) However, 
Mr. Williams expressly reserved his right to address the district court's denial of his 
request for the appointment of counsel on appeal. (R., p.44.) 
A post-conviction petitioner is entitled to the appointment of counsel "unless the 
trial court determines that the post-conviction proceeding is frivolous." Charboneau, 
140 Idaho at 792 (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679 (2001)). In order to avoid 
frivolity finding, a pro se petitioner must allege facts that raise the possibility of a valid 
claim. Id. at 793 (emphasis added). This is a low standard, as a prose petitioner "may 
not know the essential elements of a claim, potentially meritorious petitions may be 
conclusory and incomplete." Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24 (Ct. App. 2009). "[l]f facts 
are alleged giving rise to the possibility of a valid claim, the trial court should appoint 
counsel in order to give the petitioner an opportunity to work with counsel and properly 
allege the necessary supporting facts." Id. (original emphasis). "[E]very inference must 
run in the petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot 
be expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 792. 
In his initial petition, Mr. Williams claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to challenge the imposition of felony domestic battery probation conditions by his 
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probation officer. (R., pp.10, 27.) In support of this claim, Mr. Williams provided an 
affidavit stating that his probation officer required him to agree to "sign an agreement for 
felony domestic batterers, even though [he had] never been charged with or convicted 
of that crime." (R., p.13.) Mr. Williams then stated that he brought this to his trial 
counsel before his probation was revoked for violating the terms of the felony domestic 
battery probation agreement, but his attorney did not bring that fact to the district court's 
attention. (R., pp.13-14.) 
The district court provided the following rationale when it denied Mr. Williams' 
request for the appointment of counsel: 
[Mr. Williams] has not identified any evidence to support his claim. 
This hindsight appraisal of his attorney's strategic and tactical decision is 
insufficient to support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. It would 
have been a complete waste of time to contest a term imposed by his 
probation officer when the very first term of probation imposed by this 
Court allowed the probation officer to impose additional terms like the 
felony domestic battery probation terms. Defendant counsel's strategic 
decision to allocate time to more fruitful ventures will not be second-
guessed by this Court. Additionally, [Mr. Williams] has only provided this 
Court with a bare assertion that if he had not been placed on felony 
domestic battery probation his probation violation would not have resulted 
in a reinstatement of his sentence. 
(R., p.27.) 
Mr. Williams argues that the foregoing analysis is flawed for several reasons. 
First, the district court, without any citations to the record in this matter, made factual 
inferences against Mr. Williams contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court's holding that 
every inference must be made in favor of a pro se petitioner requesting the appointment 
of counsel. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792. Specifically, the district court inferred that 
trial counsel's decision to forego challenging the imposition of the conditions of 
probation was strategic. This conclusion requires multiple inferences. First, the district 
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court inferred trial counsel was aware of the imposition of the new terms of probation 
and also inferred that trial counsel made a conscious decision to forego challenging 
those terms of probation. Since the district court had no evidence that trial counsel 
made a conscious decision to forego challenging the felony domestic battery probation, 
it should have assumed there was no tactical reason for counsel's failure to challenge 
the new terms of probation. Had post-conviction counsel been appointed, that attorney 
could have possibly developed facts which refute the district court's conclusion that trial 
counsel's failure to challenge the imposition of felony domestic battery probation was a 
tactical decision. 
The second flaw in the district court decision to deny the appointment of counsel 
was the court's determination that it would have been pointless to challenge the 
imposition of the terms of probation because the district court allowed Mr. Williams' 
probation officer from to add terms of probation. Just because the terms of probation 
were potentially imposed in a legal manner did not preclude Mr. Williams' from 
challenging them as being unreasonable. For example, in recognizing that trial courts 
have broad discretion to impose the terms of probation, Idaho appellate courts have 
long recognized that, as in any other exercise of discretion, a trial courts exercise of 
discretion is not unfettered and can be challenged. State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 
843 (1987). One means by which a defendant can challenge the terms of probation is 
by arguing that they are not reasonably related to the sentencing goals of societal 
protection and rehabilitation. State v. Wardle, 137 Idaho 808, 810 (Ct. App. 2002). In 
this case, Mr. Williams was essentially claiming that his terms of probation were not 
reasonably related to rehabilitation because he was never convicted of felony domestic 
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battery and, as such, they were not reasonably related to his underlying conviction. 
(R., pp.8-14.) 
Turning to the third flaw in the district court's reasoning, Mr. Williams did provide 
facts which support his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 
imposition of felony domestic battery probation. As previously mentioned, Mr. Williams 
pointed out that he was not convicted of felony domestic battery and that the terms of 
his probation were geared toward rehabilitation of a domestic batterer. (R., pp.8-14.) It 
is apparent from the record that Mr. Williams asserted facts which supported his claim 
that the terms of felony probation were not reasonably related to his underlying 
conviction. And since that is a legal basis to challenge the terms of probation, 
Mr. Williams did present facts which give rise to a possibly valid claim. Therefore, the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Williams' request for the 
appointment of counsel. 
In sum, Mr. Williams does not need to allege facts which establish a valid claim in 
order to have counsel appointed. To the contrary, he need only establish facts which 
give rise to the possibility of a valid claim. Here, Mr. Williams claimed his attorney was 
ineffective for failing to challenge the imposition of felony domestic battery probation 
conditions and, in support of that claim, he alleged that he had never been convicted of 
felony domestic battery. He raised the possibility of a valid claim because a probationer 
can challenge a term of probation if it is not reasonably related to that protection of 
society and rehabilitation. Additionally, the district court erroneously drew an inference 
against Mr. Williams when it assumed that trial counsel's failure to object to the 
imposition of those terms of probation was based on a tactical decision by trial counsel. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Williams respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
summarily dismissing his petition and remand his case for further proceedings and with 
an instruction that counsel be appointed. 
DATED this 22nd day of October, 2013. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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